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Abstract 
Science is increasingly becoming automated. Tasks yet to be fully automated include the 
conjecturing, modifying, extending and testing of hypotheses. At present scientists have an 
array of methods to help them carry out those tasks. These range from the well-articulated, 
formal and unexceptional rules to the semi-articulated and variously understood rules-of-
thumb and intuitive hunches. If we are to hand over at least some of the aforementioned tasks 
to machines, we need to clarify, refine and make formal, not to mention computable, even the 
more obscure of the methods scientists currently employ in their inquiries. The focus of this 
essay is one such less-than-transparent methodological rule. I am here referring to the rule 
that ad hoc hypotheses ought to be spurned. This essay begins with a brief examination of 
some notable conceptions of ad hoc-ness in the philosophical literature. It is pointed out that 
there is a general problem afflicting most such conceptions, namely the intuitive judgments 
that are supposed to motivate them are not always shared. Instead of getting bogged down in 
what ad hoc-ness exactly means, I shift the focus of the analysis to one undesirable feature 
often present in alleged cases of ad hoc-ness. I call this feature the ‘monstrousness’ of a 
hypothesis. A fully articulated formal account of this feature is presented by specifying what 
it is about the internal constitution of a hypothesis that makes it monstrous. Using this 
account a monstrousness measure is then proposed and compared with the minimum 
description length approach. 
 
1. Introduction 
Science is increasingly becoming automated. Tasks yet to be fully automated include the 
conjecturing, modifying, extending and testing of hypotheses. At present scientists have an 
array of methods to help them carry out those tasks. These range from the well-articulated, 
formal and unexceptional rules to the semi-articulated and variously understood rules-of-
thumb and intuitive hunches. If we are to hand over at least some of the aforementioned tasks 
to machines, we need to clarify, refine and make formal, not to mention computable, even the 
more obscure of the methods scientists currently employ with some measure of success in 
their inquiries. The focus of this essay is one such less-than-transparent methodological 
maxim for which much confusion and disagreement persists. I am here referring to the 
maxim that ad hoc hypotheses ought to be spurned. The need to throw light on this maxim 
and, in particular, on the notion of ad hoc-ness becomes all the more obvious when one 
considers that it is routinely invoked by scientists in assessing modifications or extensions of 
existing hypotheses and conjectures of new ones. 
 
This essay begins with a brief examination of some notable contributions to the philosophical 
literature on ad hoc-ness, focusing, in particular, on two prominent conceptions. After raising 
some problems specific to these conceptions, it is pointed out that there is a more general 
problem afflicting most conceptions in the philosophical literature, namely the intuitive 
judgments that are supposed to motivate such conceptions are not always shared and indeed 
are sometimes even in conflict. The concept of ad hoc-ness is already burdened with too 
much intuitive baggage, signifying too many different things to too many different people. 
Instead of getting bogged down in what ad hoc-ness exactly means, I shift the focus of the 
analysis to one undesirable feature often, but not universally, present in alleged cases of ad 
hoc-ness. I call this feature the ‘monstrousness’ of a hypothesis for reasons that will become 
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clear below. A fully articulated formal account of this feature is given by specifying what it is 
about the internal constitution of the content of a hypothesis that makes it monstrous. Using 
this account a monstrousness measure is then proposed and compared with the minimum 
description length approach to simplicity/ad hoc-ness that is so popular in information and 
computer learning theory. It is argued that the monstrousness measure has some definite 
advantages over the minimum description length approach, at least in so far as the latter is 
traditionally conceived, but also some disadvantages. The main such disadvantage is that, as 
it stands, the measure is impracticable. The essay concludes with a proposal that seeks to 
extract a more practicable version of the measure. In doing so, the hope is that this essay 
helps prepare the ground for the delegation of a full gamut of scientific duties to the machines 
of the future. 
 
2. Ad hoc-ness 
There is a hefty amount of confusion surrounding the notion of ad hoc-ness. Given the 
notion’s prevalence in everyday discourse, a dictionary entry makes for an apt starting point 
to our investigation. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, ‘ad hoc’ means “formed, 
arranged, or done for a particular purpose only”.1 This ordinary conception of ad hoc-ness is 
reflected in compound expressions like ‘ad hoc committee’. But what does it mean for a 
hypothesis to be ad hoc? By and large, philosophers of science and other interested parties to 
this debate find the ordinary conception of ad hoc-ness deficient as an answer to this 
question. That’s where their agreement ends, however, as they quarrel over how best to go 
about answering it. As a result, several conceptions of ad hoc-ness have arisen through the 
years. 
 
Although the philosophical literature on ad hoc-ness is far from vast, there is more than 
enough material to prevent one from doing it justice in a short essay like this. I will thus 
restrict my comments to some notable contributions. Aside from Popper (1972) and Zahar 
(1973), both of which will be discussed in a bit more detail below, I would like to mention 
three other contributions in passing. The first is Leplin (1975). He identifies no less than five 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for ad hoc-ness, namely experimental 
anomaly, justification, tentativeness, consistency and non-fundamentality. Alas, his view 
suffers also from a number of serious problems (see, for example, Grünbaum 1976) and is 
ultimately premised on the misguided idea that there is a unique “concept of ‘ad hocness’ 
which the scientific community employs” (p. 316) [original emphasis]. Why it is misguided 
will, I hope, become clear in the next section. The second is Grünbaum (1976). He considers 
three temporally-relativised notions of ad hoc-ness, which he calls ad hoc (a), (b) and (c). To 
give the reader a taste, the first one is meant to cover those cases where a hypothesis is ad hoc 
at the moment of its introduction. This means, roughly, that it has neither theoretical nor 
independent empirical support or disapprobation at that moment. The second and third 
notions are progressively stronger, the latter being so strong that its historical instantiation is 
in doubt. Ultimately, none of this matters as Grünbaum argues, for the most part quite 
convincingly, that attempts to de-temporalise these notions and hence to articulate them in 
purely logical terms are likely to fail. The upshot is that Grünbaum doubts the view that there 
exists a precise and adequate conception of ad hoc-ness. The third and final contribution is 
that of Forster and Sober (1994). They contend that the term ‘ad hoc’ signifies unreasonable 
revisions to scientific theories and, in particular, to auxiliary hypotheses. Though they do not 
attempt to pin down the notion, they allude to an important connection between non-ad hoc-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The same dictionary traces the Latin expression, which literally means ‘for this’, to the middle of the sixteenth 
century. See: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/ad-hoc?q=ad+hoc 
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ness and simplicity.2 The suggestion, roughly, is that simpler hypotheses are less ad hoc. We 
return to this connection in Section 5 below.  
 
Let us now turn to Popper (1972). Popper’s conception attempts to unpack the specificity of 
an ad hoc hypothesis in terms of its lack of excess testable content. In his own words:  
 
Ad hoc explanations are explanations which are not independently testable... In order that 
the explicans should not be ad hoc, it must be rich in content: it must have a variety of 
testable consequences, and among them, especially, testable consequences which are 
different from the explicandum. It is these different testable consequences which I have in 
mind when I speak of independent tests, or of independent evidence (1972, pp. 15-16, 193) 
[original emphasis].  
 
Its connection to the ordinary conception of ad hoc-ness should be obvious. If a hypothesis H 
has no excess testable content over explicandum E, then its purpose seems at best restricted to 
that of attempting to explain E. If, however, it has excess testable content, then the hypothesis 
has a broader purpose in that it can potentially explain other evidence that may turn out to be 
true. Following Popper, we may illustrate this conception with an example from the history of 
science. The hypothesis positing the existence as well as the orbital and mass characteristics 
of the planet Neptune helps explain the perturbed orbit of Uranus within the Newtonian 
paradigm. That same hypothesis, however, has excess testable content over and above the 
perturbed orbit of Uranus. Among other things, it predicts (indeed to some extent 
successfully) additional perturbations in the orbits of other planets as well as that of the Sun 
around the solar system’s barycenter. 
 
Various problems afflict Popper’s conception, one of which will be mentioned here. The 
problem I have in mind questions the idea that excess testable content is a sufficient condition 
for non-ad hoc-ness. Take any explicans that we would all, or at least the Popperians, judge 
to be ad hoc. We can easily turn it into one that Popperians would deem non-ad hoc simply 
by conjoining to it any random proposition whose testable content exceeds that of the 
explicandum. Here’s an example. Suppose that the following hypothesis Z1 offers an ad hoc 
explanation of S1. 
 
Z1: Zeus exists and he is sometimes angry and whenever he is angry he lights up the sky with 
thunderbolts. 
 
S1: Sometimes the sky lights up with thunderbolts. 
 
Suppose, moreover, that we add a random proposition A1 to the explicans. It doesn’t matter 
whether this proposition is true or false – in this case we happen to choose a true one.   
 
A1: Free falling objects near the earth’s surface accelerate roughly at 9.81 m/s2. 
 
Following Popper’s conception, conjunction Z1 ∧ A1 is not an ad hoc explanation of S1 for it 
has excess testable (and in fact tested) content, namely that concerning the rate of 
acceleration of freely falling objects near the surface of the earth. In other words, having 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Simplicity, according to Forster and Sober, ought to be understood formally in terms of the Akaike information 
criterion. This criterion provides a method for selecting hypotheses by estimating their predictive accuracy. It 
does so by taking into account the trade-off between the simplicity of a hypothesis and its goodness-of-fit 
toward the data. For more details, see Akaike (1974). 
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excess testable content does not guarantee non-ad hoc-ness. At best, having excess testable 
content is a necessary condition for non-ad hoc-ness.3 
 
Consider next Zahar’s approach to ad hoc-ness. I here focus on one of three proposed 
conceptions put forth by him.4 A theory, holds Zahar, is ad hoc “if it has no novel 
consequences as compared with its predecessor” (1973, p. 101). A consequence or prediction 
is novel so long as the corresponding phenomenon was not the explanatory target of the 
scientists who constructed the theory. For example, the perihelion of the planet Mercury is a 
novel prediction of the general theory of relativity because the perihelion was presumably not 
explanatorily targeted by Einstein in his construction of the theory.5 There are some 
differences between Zahar’s and Popper’s conceptions. For example, Zahar construes ad hoc-
ness as a relation between successive hypotheses, not, as Popper does, simply as a kind of 
failed explanatory relation. Even so, ad hoc-ness judgments elicited from the two conceptions 
are, on the face of it at least, often in agreement. A hypothesis possessing consequences 
whose corresponding phenomena were not explanatorily targeted during construction has 
excess testable content over the phenomena it was constructed to explain. That’s not to say 
that judgments elicited from the two conceptions are never divergent however. A successor 
hypothesis with a solitary novel consequence has excess testable content and hence is non-ad 
hoc for Popper but counts as ad hoc for Zahar if that consequence is also novel for its 
predecessor.6 
 
Zahar’s conception fares no better than Popper’s. Two problems stand out. First, just because 
a successor hypothesis makes no novel predictions compared to its predecessor does not 
mean that it is any worse off or indeed ad hoc. Some progress in science involves removing 
ad hoc elements from a predecessor hypothesis to obtain a non-ad hoc, or less as hoc, 
successor hypothesis. Ridding an otherwise empirical hypothesis from supernatural posits is 
exactly one such type of progress. Using the Zeus hypothesis as an example, this would mean 
shifting from Z1 (the predecessor hypothesis) to the (admittedly meagre) S1 (successor 
hypothesis). Second, suppose that a predecessor hypothesis H explains all and only O1. 
Suppose moreover that two scientists, F and G, independently construct the same successor 
hypothesis H’, which explains all and only O1 and O2. Suppose, finally, that O2 was 
explanatorily targeted by G but not by F. Eliciting a judgment from Zahar’s conception of ad 
hoc-ness yields a contradiction:  H’ turns out to be both ad hoc and non-ad hoc.7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Grünbaum (1976, p. 343) notes Popper’s ambiguous behaviour towards the logical status of the condition of 
excess testable content, sometimes treating it as merely a sufficient condition and sometimes as both necessary 
and sufficient for non-ad hoc-ness. 
4 Here are the other two: “It is ad hoc2 if none of its novel predictions have been actually ‘verified’... [a] theory 
is said to be ad hoc3 if it is obtained from its predecessor through a modification of the auxiliary hypotheses 
which does not accord with the spirit of the heuristic of the programme” (1973, p. 101) [original emphasis]. 
Grünbaum (1976, p. 341) notes the similarities between Zahar’s notion ad hoc1 and his own notion ad hoc (c). 
For a more detailed discussion of Zahar’s notions, particularly ad hoc2, the reader may consult Redhead (1978). 
5 This example has been contested by Earman and Glymour (1978) who argue, convincingly, that the perihelion 
was in fact explanatorily targeted. Less controversial examples include all the cases involving temporally novel 
phenomena, i.e. phenomena which were not known at the time a hypothesis was constructed and hence could 
not have been explanatorily targeted by the constructors. 
6 How much divergence exists between judgments elicited from the two conceptions depends on a number of 
factors. For example, if Zahar permits the notion of novel consequences to also range over consequences that 
cannot be tested, then the divergence is significant. 
7 Strictly speaking, H’ is ad hoc for G but non-ad hoc for F. If Zahar were a subjectivist then he could perhaps 
get away with this reply by claiming that ad hoc-ness is a subjective matter. The trouble is he is not – see his 
comments (1973, pp. 103-104). What is more, if ad hoc-ness is to have any epistemic import it could not be 
something that varies from subject to subject. For more on this and related problems see Votsis (2014). 
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3. Taking a Step Back  
Is it not immature to stop our investigation into conceptions of ad hoc-ness after considering 
only two of them? Yes, but there is good reason for doing so. The existing conceptions, as 
well as at least some of the objections levelled against them, rely heavily on intuitive 
judgments about what are genuinely ad hoc or non-ad hoc cases and what are essential and 
what accidental features of ad hoc-ness. The problem is that these intuitive judgments are not 
always shared. In fact, some such judgements are sometimes in conflict. As an illustration of 
this conflict, take the intuition that ad hoc-ness is always undesirable. First off, note that this 
intuition is not inherited from the ordinary conception of ad hoc-ness. Ad hoc committees, for 
example, serve a more limited role than non-ad hoc ones but that doesn’t make them any less 
undesirable. Secondly, and more importantly, it is highly doubtful that there is a uniform 
meaning of ad hoc-ness in the scientific context. Forster and Sober, for instance, are 
categorical in their condemnation of ad hoc hypotheses: “we reserve the term ‘ad hoc’ for 
revisions of the bad kind” (1994, p. 17). But not everybody agrees. Grünbaum, for example, 
holds that “I evidently do not deny that certain uses of the term ‘ad hoc’ are intended to be 
derogatory” (1976, p. 361) [first emphasis added]. And Popper is of two minds. He 
sometimes claims that “the corresponding requirement that explanations of this kind [i.e. ad 
hoc] should be avoided are, I believe, among the main motive forces of the development of 
science” (1972, p. 192). But at other times he suggests that “... we must not exclude all 
immunizations, not even all which introduce ad hoc auxiliary hypotheses” (1974, p. 32). 
More generally, and perhaps more interestingly, Holton (1969) puts paid to the idea that 
scientists themselves share a unique conception of what it means for a hypothesis to be ad 
hoc: 
 
The scientist who adopts somebody’s hypothesis or creates his own for a specific purpose, 
“in order to account” for a bothersome result or feature of the theory, regards it as ad hoc - 
not necessarily in a derogatory sense... Thus we have found in the scientific literature 
characterizations of the following kinds for acceptable ad hoc hypotheses: “not 
inconceivable,” “reasonable,” “plausible,” “fundamental,” “natural,” “appealing,” 
“elegant,” “likely,” “assumed a priori to get the desired results,” “auxiliary” or “working 
hypothesis.” On the other hand, when an ad hoc hypothesis is rejected, we see it described 
in the following way: “artificial,” “complex,” “contrived,” “implausible,” “bothersome,” 
“unreasonable,” “improbable,” “unlikely,” “unnecessary,” “ugly.” (p. 178). 
 
How do we proceed in light of such discord? Instead of attempting to disentangle the 
intuitions behind the use of the term ‘ad hoc-ness’, I propose that we focus on one feature – 
or, otherwise put, one consistent set of intuitions – that is often associated with alleged cases 
of ad hoc-ness.8 This is a feature that I deem to be undesirable at all times for a hypothesis to 
possess. For this reason it is useful that it be given a clear conception. After all, in matters of 
sound methodology and epistemology we need concepts and rules that tell us in as 
unambiguous a way as possible what is a legitimate and what an illegitimate modification of 
a central hypothesis and/or an auxiliary, which hypotheses are likely to be true and which 
false, what evidence weighs more and what less, etc. In order to avoid any carry-over from 
the intuitive baggage associated with the term ‘ad hoc’, or the intuitive baggage of any other 
closely related term for that matter, I suggest that we use a relatively unsullied term to 
express this feature. I call it ‘monstrousness’ for reasons that will soon become apparent.9  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 One possible approach which is eschewed here is to admit several distinct notions of ad hoc-ness. In my view 
this is a legitimate approach but one that does not focus on 
9 A version of this notion was first explored in Votsis (2014). 
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4. Disjointedness and Monstrousness 
The characteristic I have in mind is something that has not gone unnoticed in discussions of 
ad hoc-ness. Grünbaum, for example, asserts that what is undesirable about some ad hoc 
hypotheses is that they are “artificial, contrived or arbitrary” (1976, p. 358). Instead of trying 
to expand on what any of these terms truly mean, a move which will inevitably pull us back 
down into controversy, I will instead employ the largely untainted term ‘monstrousness’. The 
reason why we call this characteristic, the ‘monstrousness’ of a hypothesis, is that it indicates 
the extent to which a hypothesis is assembled out of confirmationally disjointed content parts, 
in a manner similar to the way the most famous monster in literature, i.e. the monster in Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein, is assembled out of a motley of parts.10 Numerous examples of 
undesirable ad hoc hypotheses exhibit this disjointedness in good measure. This is certainly 
true of Z1. It is, however, less pervasive and perhaps even absent in hypotheses that are 
typically more desirable, e.g. the conjunction of the Newtonian paradigm with the hypothesis 
that Neptune exists and has certain orbital and other characteristics.  
 
How are we meant to understand disjointedness? I propose the following articulation: 
 
Disjointedness: Any two content parts expressed as consistent propositions A, B are 
disjointed if and only if (i) P(α/β) = P(α) for all propositions α, β where α is a relevant (and 
non-redundancy containing) deductive consequence of A and β  is a relevant (and non-
redundancy containing) deductive consequence of B and (ii) for any such pair α, β, there is 
no proposition γ that is a relevant deductive element of α ∧ β. 
 
Hence jointedness can be articulated thus: 
 
Jointedness: Any two content parts expressed as consistent propositions A, B are jointed if 
and only if (1) P(α/β) ≠ P(α) for some pair of propositions α, β where α is a relevant (and 
non-redundancy containing) deductive consequence of A and β  is a relevant (and non-
redundancy containing) deductive consequence of B or (2) for some such pair α, β, there is a 
proposition γ that is a relevant deductive element of α ∧ β. 
 
Let us take a closer look at the notion of disjointedness. Consider clause (i) first. The 
probabilities involved are meant to be objective. That is, they are meant to indicate true 
relative frequencies and/or true propensities of events, states-of-affairs, properties, etc., 
expressed by propositions. This is an important qualification as it de-subjectivises the notion 
of disjointedness (and hence jointedness) – we briefly return to this issue in the next section. 
The notion of probabilistic independence allows us to make an important first step in 
expressing the idea that two content parts are confirmationally disjointed. For if α, β are 
probabilistically independent we know that the degree of truth of the one, i.e. its probability, 
is not affected if we assume something about the truth (/falsity) of the other.11 This connects 
well with the relevance criterion of confirmation various Bayesians live by according to 
which e stands in a confirmational relation to (i.e. either confirms or disconfirms) h if and 
only if the two are probabilistically dependent. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For a discussion of the notion of content part you may consult Gemes (1994; 1997). 
11 To avoid the usual problems, and following common practice, false propositions must be assigned a non-zero 
value. 
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Properly accounting for the confirmational disjointedness of two propositions A, B requires 
that we inspect not only their total content but also the content of their parts. That’s because 
the two propositions may be probabilistically independent even though some of their parts are 
not. That’s where the notion of deductive consequence comes in handy. By checking whether 
each and every – see the next paragraph for a qualification – deductive consequence of the 
one proposition is probabilistically independent from/dependent on each and every deductive 
consequence of the other we ensure that we take all confirmation relations between A, B into 
account. Consider the following example as an illustration. Suppose that A: U1 ∧ U2 and B: 
U1 ∧ V1, that P(U1/U2)=P(U1) and P(U1/V1)=P(U1) and that P(U1) = 0.5, P(U2) = 0.5, P(V1) = 
0.5 and P(B/A) = 0.25. From the fact that U1 and U2 are probabilistically independent we can 
derive that P(U1 ∧ U2) = P(U1) * P(U2)= 0.25. So we know that P(A) = 0.25. Similarly from 
the fact that U1 and V1 are probabilistically independent we can derive that P(U1 ∧ V1) = 
P(U1) * P(V1)= 0.25 and thus we know that P(B) = 0.25. Using Bayes theorem we can thus 
derive that P(A/B) = 0.25. But that just means that A, B are probabilistically independent 
since P(A/B) = P(A). But notice that the same is not true of all the consequences of A, B. Take 
U1. It is a consequence of A and of B. But P(U1/U1) = 1 and hence P(U1/U1) ≠ P(U1). Thus, 
there is a proposition α and a proposition β, namely U1 in both cases, such that P(α/β) ≠ P(α) 
and hence A, B turn out to be jointed when we take a closer look. To recap, in order to make 
sure that two propositions are confirmationally disjointed we must demand that probabilistic 
independence holds all the way down. 
 
As already alluded, we do not actually care about all deductive consequences. This is because 
some of them are trivial. In fact, were we to take these into account we would render the 
concept of disjointedness unsatisfiable. This can be demonstrated with a simple example. 
Regardless of the exact content of A, B there are always validly derivable but trivial 
consequences of each that they have in common, e.g. A ∨ B. Such trivial common 
consequences guarantee the existence of a pair of propositions αi, βi for which P(αi/βi) ≠ 
P(αi) provided 0 < P(αi) < 1. Otherwise put, it guarantees that A, B are not disjointed. To rule 
out such cases we restrict our attention to all relevant deductive consequences. The notion of 
relevance can be found in Schurz (1991) where he explains that “the conclusion of a given 
deduction is irrelevant iff the conclusion contains a component [i.e. a formula] which may be 
replaced by any other formula, salva validitate of the deduction” (pp. 400-401).12 
 
Note that although two propositions A, B may be probabilistically independent all the way 
down, they may still be confirmationally related through jointly and relevantly – as in ‘having 
a relevant deductive consequence’ – entailing a proposition γ that neither entails on its own 
and whose truth would confirm both.13 Clause (ii) is there to ensure that there is no ‘indirect’ 
confirmational relation between A and B via such a consequence γ. If there is such a 
consequence then A, B are not disjointed. Not just any joint consequence will do. Unless we 
place some restrictions on what counts as a proposition γ, the concept of disjointedness is 
once again rendered unsatisfiable. That is, if we required only that there is no γ that any α, β 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 There is also an analogous notion that applies to predicates – see Schurz (2014). 
13 An example can be garnered from discussions of causal modelling. Two causes may be probabilistically 
independent and yet their presence may be sufficient to yield a joint effect. In many cases the presence of the 
joint effect confirms the presence of both causes. Thus, the two causes are confirmationally related even though 
they and the propositions expressing their presence are probabilistically independent – the latter presumably all 
the way down. Another example may be sourced from the domain of mathematics. Axioms are probabilistically 
independent (presumably all the way down) but two or more of them may be necessary to derive a single 
theorem. This last example is only meant as a crutch to help understand condition (ii). The view I am proposing 
here is restricted to empirical, not mathematical, hypotheses.  
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jointly (but not individually) entail then there would always be such a γ, no matter what 
content A, B possess. For example, one such γ is α ∧ β. More generally, a proposition ζ that 
is jointly (but not individually) entailed by two propositions α, β cannot play the role of γ if it 
is logically equivalent to δ ∧ ε where either δ is a relevant consequence of α or ε is a relevant 
consequence of β or both. Such joint consequences are trivial for our purposes and therefore 
incapable of assisting is us in our quest to find a confirmational relatedness between A, B that 
is not captured by condition (i). Note that to dismiss such trivial consequences we cannot rely 
on the simple notion of relevant consequence like we did before since A ∧ B is a relevant 
deductive consequence of A ∧ B, i.e. it is not the case that we can substitute any formula in it 
with any other formula without disturbing the validity of the deduction. Instead, to solve our 
problem we must rely on the associated notion of a relevant (deductive) element. A relevant 
(deductive) element of a proposition ϕ is a relevant consequence of ϕ that is also an element 
of ϕ. What is an element of ϕ? Roughly speaking, a content element is a proposition whose 
content is so small that it cannot be decomposed into smaller content parts.14 Such a 
proposition could not, for example, be logically equivalent to a conjunction of two 
probabilistically independent propositions since that would mean that the content of each is 
smaller than the original proposition. By requiring γ to be a content element we in effect rule 
out trivially derivable joint consequences like α ∧ β and indeed all the aforementioned δ ∧ ε 
pairs since they can always be decomposed into propositions with content parts that are 
smaller than γ, namely δ and ε. 
 
Finally, consider the non-redundancy qualification. This is there to simplify things. By 
redundancy-containing propositions, I mean propositions that repeat content. e.g. α ∧ α. Note 
that if some αi is a relevant deductive consequence of A, then αi1 ∧ ... ∧ αin where n > 1 is 
also a relevant deductive consequence of A, where the subscript i denotes a given proposition 
and the superscripts denote different syntactic instances of that proposition. Such 
redundancy-containing propositions as αi1 ∧ αi2 need not be considered in our evaluations of 
probabilistic (in)dependence. This is because P(α1 ∧ ... ∧ αn) = P(α1) for any proposition α 
and hence P(αi/βi) = P(αi) for some pair αi, βi if and only if P(αi1 ∧ ... ∧ αin /βi1 ∧ ... ∧ βim) = 
P(αi1 ∧ ... ∧ αin) for any n, m > 1, again where the superscripts denote different syntactic 
instances of the same proposition. The non-redundancy clause thus ensures we waste no time 
comparing redundancy-containing relevant deductive consequences.  
 
What use could we possible have for disjointedness? Well, disjointedness forms a barrier 
against the spread of confirmation. Thus even though monstrous hypotheses get confirmed 
under this view, the confirmation they receive for a content part that is disjointed from other 
content parts doesn’t spread to those other parts. For example, the truth of S1 confirms (a part 
of) Z1 precisely because Z1 was designed to entail S1 but, crucially, this confirmation does not 
spread to the non-S1 part of Z1, namely the part that asserts that Zeus exists and posits the 
existence of Zeus and the property that he is sometimes angry. The approach just outlined is 
similar to Schurz (2014) in that it aims to regulate how confirmation spreads within the 
content parts of a hypothesis. Unlike him, however, I insist that we are still dealing with a 
case of genuine confirmation when the support gained from some piece of evidence does not 
spread to content parts other than that corresponding to the evidence. My approach thus 
offers a unified treatment of confirmation relations. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For a detailed exposition, see Schurz and Weingartner (2010). 
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Hypotheses may possess both disjointed and non-disjointed content parts. To be exact, since 
disjointedness and non-disjointedness are relations that hold between various content parts of 
hypotheses, the claim is that hypotheses may possess content parts, some of which are 
disjointed and others non-disjointed to other content parts. It is my conjecture that almost all 
hypotheses will have some disjointed parts and hence will be monstrous to some extent. It 
thus makes sense to devise a way to measure the level of monstrousness of a hypothesis. But 
before we do that we must consider one last complication.  
 
Should judgments of monstrousness be affected by the way the same content is distributed 
between two propositions? We are obviously free to cut up content any which way we like, 
i.e. content distribution is an arbitrary affair. Being arbitrary means that it doesn’t tell us 
anything about the world. Hence, in answer to the above question, the way in which content 
is distributed should not affect our monstrousness judgements. Take two propositions A1, B1 
where A1: D1 ∧ D2 ∧ D3 and B1: E1. Suppose that when we compare these propositions using 
some measure of monstrousness we get some score w1. Now take another two propositions 
A1’, B1’ where A1’: D1 ∧ D2 and B1’: E1 ∧ D3. Suppose that when we compare A1’, B1’ using 
the same measure of monstrousness the resulting score is w2. According to the above 
argument, since A1 ∧ B1 has the same content as A1’ ∧ B1’ any proposed measure of 
monstrousness should ensure that w1 = w2. That is to say, monstrousness judgments should be 
invariant under different ways of distributing the same content between two propositions. 
 
One, perhaps the only, way to pull this off is to calculate monstrousness scores on the basis of 
all distinct ways of distributing the same content between two propositions. In what follows, I 
put forth a proposal of exactly such a measure. The proposed measure is not the final word on 
the matter but still worth considering since, in my view, it is heading in the right direction.15 
Without further ado, here’s the proposal: The monstrousness of two propositions is given by 
the ratio of the sum of disjointed pairs of parts taken from all distinct ways of distributing 
content to the sum of the total number of pairs of parts (i.e. jointed and disjointed) taken from 
all distinct ways of distributing content. Formally, the monstrousness m of two propositions 
A, B is given by the following function: 
 
 
 
where diA,B denotes the number of disjointed pairs in a given content distribution i, tiA,B 
denotes the total number of jointed plus disjointed pairs in a given distribution i, the 
superscript A, B denotes that each i is a distribution of the same content as that contained in A 
∧ B and n denotes the total number of content distributions.16 
 
The number of disjointed pairs in a given content distribution is determined by counting how 
many times a different pair of relevant deductive consequences α, β turn out to be 
probabilistically independent and for which no proposition γ that is a relevant deductive 
element of α ∧ β exists. Any pair that is not disjointed is counted as jointed. The higher 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 One reason for its inadequacy is that when a pair of propositions α, β are deemed jointed the strength of their 
jointedness, e.g. the degrees of their probabilistic dependence, is neglected. Such information should surely have 
a role in any suitably sensitive measure of monstrousness. 
16 This function only makes sense if the total number of content distributions is finite. I am assuming this is the 
case. Arguments for this assumption can be given but require quite a bit of stage-setting. For now, it suffices to 
say that this assumption is guaranteed to hold if the hypotheses in question can be fully decomposed into a finite 
number of content elements. 
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(/lower) the value of m the more (/less) monstrous the content expressed by A ∧ B. Note that 
this value is the same no matter how we cut A, B since we take into account all other ways 
the same content can be distributed between two propositions. 
 
One of the advantages of the proposed measure is that it is quite broad in its range of 
application. This is due to the fact that the notions of jointedness and disjointedness don’t 
place any restrictions on the propositions being compared other than the restriction that they 
are consistent. As a result, the said propositions can be drawn from a large pool of entries 
which includes central hypotheses, auxiliaries, explanantia and explananda. This not only 
allows us to gauge the monstrousness of the most commonly touted relations, e.g. the relation 
between a central hypothesis and an auxiliary hypothesis or the relation between an 
explanans and an explanandum, but also of any other relation we can think of, e.g. the 
relation between one auxiliary hypothesis and another. But what about individual 
hypotheses? How does a comparative measure like monstrousness pass judgment on 
individual hypotheses? Without difficulty as it so happens. So long as such hypotheses are 
not content elements, we can split their content into two propositions which can then be 
compared.17 Thus even individual hypotheses have a monstrousness score. This should not be 
surprising as whether or not a given proposition forms part of, say, a central hypothesis or is a 
detached auxiliary seems to be (at least occasionally) a matter of convention. 
 
5. Monstrousness and MDL 
This essay is meant to give some guidance, however limited, on the subject of how machines 
may automate the task of discriminating between bad and good hypotheses. With this aim in 
mind it is worth comparing, albeit briefly and superficially, my approach to a leading 
approach employed in information and computer learning theory, namely the minimum 
description length (MDL) approach. MDL is a hypothesis selection principle. The best 
hypothesis, according to this approach, is the one that provides the most economical 
compression of the data. It is not hard to see how MDL is related to the demand for simpler 
hypotheses. Thus, Rissanen, MDL’s founding father, doesn’t hesitate to assert that “the 
notion of simplicity is entirely in line with the modern notions of complexity of description” 
(1983, p. 421). The notion of ad hoc-ness is not as prominent in this literature. But when it 
does make its appearance the central idea seems to be that simpler hypotheses are less ad hoc 
– an idea that, as we earlier saw, Forster and Sober also find attractive. 
 
... the minimum description length principle... extends Occam’s Razor to say that the best 
hypothesis is the one that minimizes the total length of the hypothesis plus the description 
of the exceptions to the hypothesis. The intuition is that ad hoc hypotheses are simply lists 
of examples, which makes them no shorter than the examples they purport to summarise. 
In contrast, good hypotheses reduce many examples to a simple, general rule (Shavlik and 
Dietterich 1990, p. 47) [original emphasis]. 
 
There are obvious similarities between my measure of monstrousness and MDL measures of 
simplicity. For example, a hypothesis that conjoins propositions that express disparate facts, 
e.g. a1 is a white swan ∧ a2 is a white dwarf, gets a high monstrousness score and a low MDL 
simplicity score since its length is presumably no shorter than the combined length of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Two points are worth making. First, as we saw earlier any such division is adequate as all divisions must be 
considered before a monstrousness score is produced. Second, our exclusion of hypotheses that are content 
elements is inconsequential since such hypotheses cannot but be wholly non-monstrous given that they have no 
distinct content parts that can be disjointed.  
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individual propositions it seeks to summarise.18 But there are also differences. A hypothesis 
that conjoins propositions that express related facts, e.g. b1 is a white swan ∧ b2 is a white 
swan ∧ ... ∧ bn is a white swan, but does not convey them in terms of a generalisation, e.g. all 
observed swans are white, gets a low simplicity score for the abovementioned reason but 
does not get a high monstrousness score. The reason for the latter is that the individual facts 
are not probabilistically independent all the way down since they are systematically related 
via common relevant deductive consequences, e.g. the claim that there is a white swan. A 
corollary is that under the monstrousness approach, and contra MDL, a conjunction of 
propositions expressing related facts gets the same score as a generalisation of them since 
they both possess the same content and hence share the same distinct ways of distributing that 
content between two propositions. 
 
Two further differences between these approaches, this time at a more abstract level, are 
worth pondering over. Monstrousness is determined by objective facts about the true relative 
frequencies and/or true propensities of events, states-of-affairs, properties, etc., expressed by 
the propositions being compared. Its determination is thus a thoroughly a posteriori matter 
and herein lies the strength of this approach. By contrast, the MDL approach to simplicity 
seems to reward or penalise hypotheses in a strongly a priori manner by insisting that the 
simplest hypothesis is the best regardless of facts on the ground. That’s the first difference 
between the two approaches. The second difference concerns practicality. Here the earlier 
mentioned strength of the monstrousness approach turns into a weakness. Since the 
probabilities involved are objective and we have limited access to these the approach is 
severely handicapped in its practicability. The same is not true of the MDL approach, which, 
by virtue of its strong a prioricity, is capable of offering advice even in the face of limited 
access to facts on the ground. 
 
Allow me to draw this section to a close by contemplating how one might go about turning 
the monstrousness approach into something more practicable. Recall that what this approach 
is supposed to measure is the confirmational (dis)jointedness between content parts of a 
hypothesis. Now, although we have limited access to the objective probabilities that 
determine the said confirmational (dis)jointedness we are not completely in the blind. One 
kind of information that is more readily accessible concerns the deductive relations between 
different content parts. For example, we can at least judge whether or not two content parts 
are logically independent. Moreover, we can judge whether or not any of their relevant (and 
non-redundancy containing) deductive consequences are logically independent. And we can 
even judge whether or not the conjunction of any pair of such consequences yields a relevant 
deductive element. Although these judgments fall short of empowering a full assessment of 
the monstrousness of a hypothesis, they at least give us some hints about the general 
trajectory such an assessment ought to take. Whether or not these hints are more informative 
than MDL-derived recommendations remains to be seen. My hunch is that, allowing for 
suitable modifications, these two approaches should in principle be capable of reaching 
similar levels of informativeness. 
 
6. Conclusion 
To summarise: In the first part of the essay I briefly considered some prominent philosophical 
accounts of ad hoc-ness and argued that these are deficient in some important respects. I then 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 There are also intimate connections between the minimum description length approach and the idea of a 
content element, as it is conceived by Schurz and Weingartner (2010), since the latter is understood in terms of 
the length of a formula after it has been transformed to its negation-normal form.	  
Forthcoming	  in	  V.	  C.	  Müller	  (ed.),	  Fundamental	  Issues	  of	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  (Synthese	  Library),	  
Berlin:	  Springer.	  Penultimate	  Draft.	  
	  
made the case that appeal to intuitive judgments would only help adjudicate between rival 
conceptions of ad hoc-ness if those judgments were shared, something that is plainly not true. 
As an alternative, I recommended that we drop the intuitively-loaded term ‘ad hoc-ness’ and 
shift our focus onto a genuinely undesirable feature of hypotheses. I dubbed this feature that 
is often, but not universally, present in presumed examples of ad hoc-ness the 
‘monstrousness’ of a hypothesis. I then proceeded to explicate this notion by means of the 
technical notions of probabilistic independence, content part, relevant consequence and 
relevant deductive element. I followed that up with a proposed measure of the monstrousness 
of hypotheses. I subsequently, and admittedly fleetingly, compared this monstrousness 
measure with the general spirit of MDL approaches to simplicity/ad hoc-ness. The outcome 
of that comparison was that the former profits from its a-posteriori attitude towards the 
problem it studies but only at the expense of practicability while the latter does the opposite. 
The essay concluded with a suggestion of how to understand monstrousness in a more 
practicable manner, one that hopefully leads to actionable advice concerning the 
conjecturing, extending and modifying of hypotheses. 
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